UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24477
22 August 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 AUGUST 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to present to you the attached letter and two enclosures, dated 16 August 1992 from my Prime Minister, Mr. Jure Pelivan.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 16 August 1992 from the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General

In view of the still continuing aggression and terrorism against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we request you to urge the Security Council to station United Nations observers along the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the neighbouring States of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. These observers would be joined by representatives of the legal Government with a view to performing those functions proper to border crossings between States.

Military equipment and new reinforcements are continually arriving on our territory from Serbia and Montenegro, the States responsible for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. This can be seen from the enclosed information (enclosure I). Also, from the Republic of Croatia units of the former Yugoslav Army and paramilitary formations are constantly arriving to whom the former Yugoslav Army has given arms and which are now withdrawing from those parts of Croatia where United Nations control has been established.

Furthermore, the aggressors are looting and removing to Serbia and Montenegro natural resources, industrial equipment and finished products from Bosnia and Herzegovina. This form of theft is extremely widespread, and we are unable to prevent it without international help. Information concerning this is enclosed (enclosure II).

In view of the above, we are convinced that proper protection of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the implementation of the Security Council resolutions and the demands of the international community, are not possible without supervision of our frontiers, along with other measures.

We trust that this request will be met with your understanding and support.

(Signed) Jure PELIVAN
Prime Minister

Enclosure I

Information on continuing support in manpower and equipment arriving from Serbia and Montenegro to the aggressors' units on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Relying upon the arms potentials of the ex-Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) leadership first armed a narrow circle of its members and continued by arming entire communities, villages and parts of towns with mixed population. Most of the arms, ammunition and military equipment is derived from Army arsenals, while the training of armed civilians was held on Army premises, with ex-JNA officers as instructors. A part of the formations, armed and trained in this manner, took part in the war operations in the Republic of Croatia. While withdrawing from Croatia, the Yugo-Army stationed complete combat units on the territory of our Republic. Thus the tank unit from Jasterbarsko was relocated to Dubrave, near Tuzla, a smaller part being stationed in the region of Prijedor, while the Knin Corps units were sent to the localities of Bosanski Petrovac, Drvar, Bosansko Grahovo and Kupres. The unit from "Zeljave" airport, near Bihać, with about 50 combat planes, was relocated to Mahovljani near Banja Luka.

After the establishment of "pink zones" in the Republic of Croatia, which are supposed to be under United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) control, a new massive regrouping of the ex-JNA forces from the territory of Croatia to that of Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out, from the so-called SAO Kraina and Slavonia in particular. Fifty-six tanks have been relocated from Lička Ploča to "Zeljave" airport, while the imagined border line between Croatia and "the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" has been reinforced by the units that have crossed the border region at Petrinja, Dvorna Uni and Glina. The effect of the Knin and Karlovac Corps activities can be seen all over "the autonomous Banja Luka region", while in the region of Podrinje and Herzegovina, the Valjevo, Užice and Titograd Corps units are operating.

At the beginning of June 1992 Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić sent a group of Chetnik commanders, among them Božo Vučurević, Duško Kornjača, Ratko Adžić and Radomir Nešković, to Mirko Jović, Vojislav Šešelj and Captain Dragan's headquarters to provide for an urgent supply of "fresh forces". The task of Karadžić's voivodas was to speed up the dispatch of manpower and equipment to reinforce the units preparing for the general attack to be launched at Goražde. One part of the enemies' forces has arrived to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while a convoy of 60 tanks was ready for Goražde via Čajniče. Karadžić promised his commanders that he would block out the United Nations and UNPROFOR observers, i.e. engage them with the problems in the Sarajevo area, during the offensive operations in Goražde and in the direction of the Neretva, in other words, keep them busy with Sarajevo until Goražde had been wiped out, and the business in Herzegovina completed.

At the beginning of July the Chetniks transferred from Butmir airport to Lukavica 27 trucks of goods of all kinds, mainly spare parts for airport installations, previously brought from "Pleso" airport, Zagreb, and Zemunik, near Zadar. Along with other equipment, seven tanks, six armoured transporters and four anti-aircraft machine-guns were dislocated whereas the armoured vehicles were relocated from the airport premises to Lukavica barracks. According to the agreement reached with the Jugo-Army from Serbia, the SDS extremists posted around Sarajevo expected a new shipment of ammunition by the beginning of July (one shipment containing about 1,500 12-millimetre bullets and 1,000 12.5-millimetre bullets).

However, ever new troops of "volunteers" have been arriving at Pale from Belgrade, Valjevo and Čačak. At the same time new shipments of ammunition are arriving from Serbia, whereas goods or all sorts of equipment are being taken out of the Republic.

The bridges at Ilidža are controlled by irregulars from Valjevo, Aleksandrovac and Aleksinac.

A larger convoy with arms has been stationed in Rogatica, while numerous army vehicles and buses with irregulars from Serbia have been reported in the region of Foča. Besides the new troops of "Šešelj's men" and "Arkan's Gang" have arrived from Serbia in the region of Mostar and Neum, disguised in civilian clothes and with forged identification papers.

During the preparations for the offensive against Goražde, large groups of "volunteers" from Serbia and Montenegro have concentrated in the surrounding of Priboj so that now there are several thousand men along with heavy artillery and infantry armament. The units are to be committed on the fronts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Captain Dragan in charge of the operation. The main centres for distribution of manpower and equipment from Serbia and Montenegro are in Priboj (Serbia), Nikšić and Pljevlje (Montenegro). The "volunteers" are behaving very violently towards the Muslim population in Priboj and its surroundings, with numerous cases of rape and mining of Muslim property, which has led to a massive evacuation of the Muslim population which has been forced to find refuge in West European countries.

After completing their military training in Bijeljina barracks, the irregulars were committed to the front lines in Brčko, and in the direction of Tuzla and Majevica region. The ex-JNA still continues providing reinforcements for the aggressors' forces on the Brčko battlefield. On 18 June Lieutenant-Colonel Stevan Nikolić, known as "Kriger", informed Srećko Radovanović, a Res. Maj., that General Delic from Belgrade, confirmed upon General Mladic's approval the reinforcement in 10 R-84 tanks and 10 armoured vehicles for the units stationed in Pelagićevo. Lieutenant-Colonel Predrag Manojlović, the Brčko barracks commander, ordered from Belgrade ammunition (calibres 30 and 29 millimetres) along with bazookas and hand grenades for the needs of garrisons stationed in Brčko and Bosanski Šamac. Upon the Belgrade Army District order, Lieutenant-Colonel Manojlović took out of VP 5055-19 Belgrade-Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia 741,000

bullets, calibre 7.62 millimetres, mines, 740 pieces; 5,500 bullets, calibre 30 and 20 millimetres; and 120 hand grenades. The receipts for the ammunition were signed by the ex-JNA officers from Belgrade, Miroslav Janičić, M. Radojević and B. Stanišić.

A heavy truck loaded with artillery and infantry ammunition arrived at Pelagićevo from Belgrade in mid-June. According to some reports on the combat readiness of Yugo-Army units, even up to 450 tons of ammunition were destined to a front. Besides support in armament, the ex-JNA assisted the aggressors' forces on Brčko front in personnel too. Twenty officers from Serbia came to be engaged there. In Brčko, the so-called War Presidency of "the Serbian municipality of Brčko" has recently made a decision to citizenship papers of "the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" also to all the irregulars from Serbia and Montenegro, which would give them equal rights and obligations with other citizens of this so-called republic.

The data given in this enclosure is intended only to illustrate the continuing reinforcement of the aggressors' units on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in both manpower and equipment coming from Serbia and Montenegro. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has at its disposition a substantially larger list of similar cases and all the relevant documentation.

Enclosure II

Information on the theft and removal of natural resources, industrial equipment and finished products from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Serbia and Montenegro, the aggressors against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the ex-JNA and federal institutions of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in cooperation with extremist and paramilitary forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prepared a plan of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A part of the plan was the destruction and theft of natural resources, industrial equipment and finished products. The realization of the plan started long before the armed aggression. Although we do not have complete information on the scale of the theft and removal of the natural resources, industrial equipment and finished products to Serbia and Montenegro, it can be said without hesitation that a large part of the entire property of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been taken to Serbia and Montenegro.

Since Serbia and Montenegro have been defined as aggressors against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by United Nations resolutions, it is our intention to present by this information only a part of the theft and removal of the natural resources, industrial equipment and finished products.

In those regions of the Republic, where the human and international rights have been violated, the aggressor is also looting both State and individual property in order to take the looted goods to Serbia and Montenegro. The illegal felling of forests, the theft of livestock and property to be illegally transported and sold at markets in Serbia and Montenegro has caused great material damage to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The banks and other financial institutions have been robbed by Serbian and Montenegrin financial institutions and companies.

This information is aimed, with the purpose of partial documenting of the above-mentioned claims, to point to some of the major cases of theft and removal of natural resources, industrial equipment and finished products to Serbia and Montenegro. The full list with similar cases is much more extensive, but unfortunately it cannot be completed because of the war. The relevant institutions are still collecting the required documentation and information in order to provide a full picture of the situation.

- Industrial equipment of priceless value has been looted from several premises of the United Nations Information Service at Sarajevo and taken to Serbia;

- In June 1992, 27 heavy trucks loaded with finished and semi-finished products for military purposes were taken out of the Pretis enterprise at Vogošća near Sarajevo and taken to Belgrade;

- In the beginning of May 1992, several trucks loaded with spare parts for army transporters and tanks were taken from the Famos Enterprise at Hrasnica, near Sarajevo, and taken to the barracks at Pančevo, Serbia.

- Sixty engines and 50 gear boxes with accessories were also taken from Famos to Serbia, exchanged for raw material (steel and iron) via Macedonia, to be returned to Serbia and illegally confiscated;

- The Energoinvest Compressor Factory "Trudbenik" was also looted and its equipment taken to Serbia. The theft took place in May and June 1992;

- The equipment from the Furniture Factory "Varda", Višegrade was taken to Serbia in May 1992;

- Brčko Oil Factory equipment was taken to Serbia in June 1992;

- A substantial part of the aircraft factory "Soko", Mostar, was also taken to Serbia and Montenegro;

- A plan for the relocation of a major part of the production units of "Orao" Industries at Rajlovac, near Sarajevo, has been made, according to which the equipment was to be transported to Trsteno in Serbia;

- Several aircraft and helicopters, the property of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were taken from Sarajevo Airport during May 1992;

- In May 1992, the aggressor looted and took to Serbia the major part of the Interplet factory at Koraj, Tuzla;

- The equipment of the Plum Drying Factory at Koraj, Tuzla, was also looted in May 1992;

- The aggressor is looting power directing it from the thermo power plants at Gacko and Ugljevik and the water power plants on the Drina and the Trebišnjica to Serbia and Montenegro;

- Trucks, buses, trains and locomotives were illegally taken from a score of transport organizations in the Republic ("Centrotrans" and "ZTP", The City Transport Organization of Sarajevo, etc.);

- Ore, semi-finished products and mining equipment were taken from a dozen mines in Eastern Bosnia to Serbia in May and June 1992;

- Numerous enterprises, institutions and organizations have also been looted, their equipment, along with investments and technical documentation, were taken to Serbia (processing factory at Sarajevo, Water Economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Famos factory, etc.);

- A great number of medical institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been robbed of medical equipment, medicines and medical material which have been taken to Serbia and Montenegro.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24478
24 August 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 AUGUST 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to the Presidential Statement of 4 August 1992 requesting more information regarding gross human rights violations on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am enclosing the translation of resolution No. 01-800-85/92 of 23 July 1992, issued by the War Presidency of the Municipality of Celinac (region of Banja Luka temporarily occupied by the Belgrade regime and its surrogates in Bosnia and Herzegovina) regarding the status of the non-Serbian population.

I should be grateful if the text of this resolution could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex

Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Municipality of Celinac
War Presidency

No. 01-800-85/92
Date: 23 July 1992

On the meeting held on 23 July 1992, the War Presidency of the Municipality of Celinac has passed the following Resolution about the status of non-Serbian citizens in the Municipality of Celinac:

Article 1

With reference to combat activities on the territory of the Municipality of Celinac as well as out of its municipal borders, there are well-founded reasons to determine a special status for the non-Serbian population which clearly defines its rights, obligations and responsibilities.

Article 2

1. Memeic (Edhem) Halil
2. Memic (Edhem) (Osman)
3. Hodzic (Pasa) Refik
4. Hodzic (Pasa) Dzevad
5. Hodzic (Pasa) Dzemal
6. Hodzic (Pasa) Kemal
7. Hodzic (Edib) Munib
8. Bekaric (Mustafa) Esad
9. Tenic (Refik) Zinaid
10. Nezirevic (Istif) Ekrem
11. Mecacvica (Adem) Mirsad
12. Nezirevic (Esad) Suad
13. Sejdic (Hasan) Hasenad
14. Nezirovic (Esad) Ibrahim
15. Masic (Ibro) Hasim
16. Masic (Ibro) Tasim
17. Malkic (Fahrudin) Armin
18. Nezirovic (Kasim) Salih
19. Nezirovic (Saban) Nazif
20. Hodzic (Abaz) Munib
21. Sprahic Remzija
22. Mandal (Adem) Serif
23. Sabanovic (Bakir) Saban
24. Sabanovic (Bakir) Naim
25. Beharic (Hamdija) Mirsad
26. Smajic (Mahmud) Bejir
27. Culum (Salih) Hamdija
28. Toplic (Muhamed) Nijaz
29. Zahirovic (Muhamed) Mustafa
30. Malkic (Dzemal) Fahrudin
31. Baharic (Muhamed) Ismet
32. Basic (Ibrahim) Nijaz
33. Nazirovic (Idriz) Hilmija
34. Lukic (Anto) Josip

It is judged that these individuals have acted and expressed themselves negatively in other ways, affecting the Serbian people. Because of that a special treatment is determined for these individuals.

Article 3

The citizens from article 2 have the right to live undisturbed within the limits of their households, to work and produce, thus satisfying their vital needs, while the municipal authority will ensure personal and proprietary safety.

Article 4

The citizens mentioned in article 2 are allowed to leave the territory of the Municipality of Celinac provided that relocation is done in an organized manner and provided that the entire family household is relocated. The authorities in charge will provide necessary documents and safe passage.

Article 5

The citizens from article 2 are forbidden to:

- Move through town of Celinac from 1600 until 0600 hours;
- Stop in the streets, restaurants, cafés and other public places;
- Swim in the rivers Vrbanja and Josavica, go fishing and hunting;
- Travel from Celinac to other towns without permission given by the relevant municipal authority;
- Possess any kind of firearms, irrespective of the possession of valid licence;
- Drive or in other ways use a car;
- Get together in groups larger than three men;
- Contact with family members who do not reside on the territory of the Municipality of Celinac, without special permission. The citizens have to report the presence of such persons in their homes;
- Use any other means of communication except postal telephone;
- Keep, put on and wear any kind of uniform (military, police, forester);
- Sell real estate and exchange the apartments without special permission from the relevant municipal authority.

Article 6

- The citizens mentioned in article 2 of this resolution are obliged to report dutifully for the working obligation, act in an obedient way and not to affect the struggle of the Serbian people for freedom;

- The citizens are obliged to show full solidarity towards poor individuals from their national group;

- The citizens are obliged to take cover from possible aerial actions in cellars and shelters and to protect children, women and disabled persons;

- The citizens are obliged to pay regularly their legal obligations;

- All citizens are obliged to report the presence of armed groups or individuals, members of Ustachi army or Green Berets;

- In case of natural disaster (fire, flood, earthquake) the citizens are obliged to undertake all necessary measures in order to save the people and the property;

- The citizens are obliged to take a certain number of cattle to feed and tend, if military authorities so require.

Article 7

The citizens from article 2 of this resolution, besides the above-mentioned obligations, are forbidden to have any kind of contact with the individuals from the neighbourhood and to move from 0000 to 2400 hours, except if called for working obligation.

Article 8

The obligations quoted in this resolution are not applicable to a certain number of households and individuals for which the War Presidency issues a special certificate.

Article 9

This resolution comes into force from the date of issuance and will be applied starting with 2 August 1992.

Article 10

Non-compliance with this resolution will result in responsibilities in accordance with the existing law.

Article 11

The Police Headquarters of the Municipality of Celinac as well as other relevant municipal bodies are in charge of enforcement of this resolution.

War Presidency
(Stamp and signature)

Sent to:

- Police Headquarters in Celinac
- Headquarters of Light Infantry Brigade in Celinac
- All households
- Archive

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24479
24 August 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 24 AUGUST 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that United States aircraft continued their violations of Iraqi airspace for purposes of observation and provocation during the period 13 to 21 August 1992.

13-14 August 1992

Ten sorties, flown by five two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 2,000 to 7,500 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul, Amadiyah and Tall Afar.

14-15 August 1992

Eighteen sorties, flown by nine two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 7,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

15-16 August 1992

Twenty-nine sorties, flown by 13 two-aircraft formations and one three-aircraft formation at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 3,500 to 8,500 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

16-17 August 1992

Four sorties, flown by two two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 5,500 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

19-20 August 1992

Eleven sorties, flown by four two-aircraft formations and one three-aircraft formation at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 2,000 to 5,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

20-21 August 1992

Nineteen sorties, flown by nine two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 800 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 6,000 metres, centred over Amadiyah, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil and Tall Afar.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24480
24 August 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 767 (1992), which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 27 July 1992.

2. Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, I brought its contents to the attention of the concerned Somali factions and movements. I also transmitted copies to the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, and to the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), OAU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

3. A technical team was established under the leadership of Mr. Peter Hansen, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, and visited Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992, having assembled in Nairobi on 4 August. During its stay in Somalia, it travelled to Bardera, Baidoa, Belet Wien, Kismayu, Galkaio, Garowe, Bossasso, Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera. At all these places, it met with the leaders and representatives of various Somali factions and movements, as well as with elders. (See the annex to the present report for the team's itinerary and programme of meetings.)

4. Members of the team also visited Haddour and Dushareb, as well as Mandera, Bulacao, Liboi, and Diboi, on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border. An aerial survey of the border was also undertaken.

5. On 17 August, the team leader held consultations with the Kenyan authorities on issues of particular concern to them.

6. On his return to New York on 21 August 1992, the team leader delivered his report to me. The present report describes the action currently being taken by the United Nations in response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and contains my recommendations for other action which needs to be taken

immediately. Further reports will in due course be presented on action to be taken in the medium and longer term.

I. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

7. My previous reports to the Security Council have described in detail the humanitarian needs of the affected populations in Somalia and the urgency of establishing appropriate arrangements for the delivery and distribution of relief supplies throughout the country. The Council will, in particular, recall the consolidated inter-agency 90-day plan of action for emergency humanitarian assistance to Somalia which was annexed to my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829/Add.1).

8. United Nations agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have continued throughout this period to implement the 90-day plan and to intensify and extend their humanitarian activities in Somalia. So far this year, the World Food Programme (WFP) has delivered 36,500 metric tons of food to Somalia, mainly to Mogadishu. WFP is ready to deliver another 30,000 metric tons immediately and plans to deliver the additional 85,000 metric tons called for in the latest of the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA) appeal, as soon as the necessary conditions can be created and donor support is available. Since the beginning of 1992, ICRC has delivered 83,000 metric tons of food to various parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu. It plans to deliver another 70,000 metric tons during the next five months. Bilateral donors such as Saudi Arabia and France have also shipped food and other assistance.

9. Since March, a joint WFP/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) airlift has transported over 1,300 metric tons of supplementary food and medical supplies from Nairobi to Mogadishu, Kismayu, Boroma and Baidoa. The airlift is continuing with two flights a day. As of July, UNICEF has been operating 8 mother and child health (MCH) centres at Mogadishu and provides support, including drugs and equipment, to 17 other MCH centres at Mogadishu, 2 at Kismayu, 1 in Baidoa and 7 in the north of Somalia. Medical equipment and fuel have also been supplied by UNICEF to hospitals and medical posts in Kismayu, Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Boroma. Mobile clinics have been used to assist 19 village health posts in the central and southern regions, in addition to 22 displaced persons camps at Kismayu and 68 in Mogadishu. Vaccination programmes have also been undertaken.

10. The World Health Organization (WHO), while not present in Somalia, has continued to support NGOs and self-help groups through the provision of basic health and drugs kits, equipment and medicines. WHO reports that during the past five months it has sent to Somalia each month an average US$ 250,000 worth of medical and other supplies.

11. These efforts, however, are in no way adequate to meet the overall needs of the Somali people. Present estimates, which may be conservative, indicate

that as many as 4.5 million Somalis are in desperate need of food and other assistance. Death and starvation are widespread, especially in the central and southern parts of Somalia. The absence of food is a significant cause of the large-scale population movements that are taking place from Somalia into Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

12. The United Nations and its partners are ready and have the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance but they have been prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security that prevail throughout Somalia, often including Mogadishu itself. Heavily armed gangs overrun delivery and distribution points and loot supplies directly from docked ships as well as from airports and airstrips. I have previously reported to the Security Council the looting of high protein food and medicines at Mogadishu airport. More recently, on 16 August, while the technical team was in Somalia, armed gangs looted the first large-scale WFP shipment to Kismayu, as well as the entire consignment of diesel oil, which is essential for the transport of food to distribution centres. Current security conditions do not permit the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport and are thus the main cause of the current food crisis in Somalia.

13. The crisis is further compounded by drought in the South and the fact that the agriculture, livestock and fisheries sectors have been devastated by the civil war. The food supply situation in Somalia will remain serious for the foreseeable future. In 1992, the cereal harvest will be poor because of insufficient rainfall, the absence of security and the collapse of infrastructure and markets. Food imports required by Somalia during the period from July 1992 to June 1993 are likely to be more than 500,000 metric tons. Food aid distributed free or sold on the market will have to meet most of this requirement.

14. Also because of the war, such health infrastructure as remains in Somalia can, at best, be described as rudimentary. Of the 15 hospitals that remain partially operational, most have neither water nor electricity nor drugs. The sanitary situation is deteriorating at an alarming pace and primary health care is practically non-existent. Disease is exacerbated by malnutrition and hunger.

15. Given the difficulties, I have come to the conclusion that the present airlift operations (already being carried out by WFP and UNICEF, as well as ICRC) need to be substantially enhanced. The technical team has recommended that for the immediate future airlift operations should be directed to the areas of need located primarily in central and southern Somalia, with priority attention being given to Baidoa, Hoddur, Bardera and Belet Wien.

16. Until Berbera port and the roads leading from it are secured, ad hoc airlifting of non-food items and supplementary food items may also be necessary from Djibouti to destinations in the north-west such as Hargeisa, Burao, Las Anod and Borama, where it is estimated that the displaced population and returnees from camps in Ethiopia number some 350,000 vulnerable persons. A worsening of the general food situation in these northern regions

is imminent because of the severe diminution of livestock, which has reached 75 per cent. Unless this can be halted, destitute agro-pastoralists will constitute a new wave of starving people flocking to the towns. There is thus a need for urgent provision of veterinary assistance.

17. The international community has expressed keen interest in contributing to an urgent airlift. The immediate offers of assistance received from the Governments of Canada, France, Germany and the United States of America are most welcome. This relief effort must, however, be carefully coordirated to ensure that there is no duplication of effort, that food and other relief items reach those most in need, and that suitable arrangements are made on the ground to ensure effective distribution and, where necessary, adequate security. Given the overall role, capacity and the experience of WFP in food aid and logistics, I have asked it to coordinate, within the United Nations, the current airlift initiative. Its Regional Logistics Office at Nairobi will be designated to serve as the focal point for these functions. The Regional Logistics Office will organize the airlift, in close liaison with all contributors, as well as relevant United Nations agencies and NGOs.

18. All contributors are asked to contact the Regional Logistics Office with offers of planes, food and non-food relief supplies, regardless of whether the assistance is to be placed at the disposal of United Nations operational organizations, NGOs or ICRC or delivered bilaterally. The Regional Logistics Office will provide the necessary advice and guidance on the capacities of airstrips, the arrangements for handover and distribution and related security considerations. As far as food is concerned, donors are requested to make available basic food commodities that are not of high value, in order to minimize looting and civil unrest.

19. The Regional Logistics Office will work closely with the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator for Somalia, Mr. David Bassiouni, who, under the direction of my Special Representative, will continue to exercise overall responsibility for coordination, especially the identification of specific needs, priority areas for the airlift operation and all questions relating to the distribution of assistance. He will cooperate closely with the Commander of the military component of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in matters relating to the protection of relief operations in Somalia.

20. I would like to reiterate that the critical problem facing the United Nations in its humanitarian activities in Somalia is how to ensure the security of relief supplies at all stages, namely delivery, storage and distribution. It must also be underlined that critically important though the airlift may be, it cannot be a substitute for an effective surface-delivered programme of assistance through Somalia's ports and overland routes with WFP continuing to exercise leadership in logistics and food transportation. For this, effective security and ground arrangements are a <u>sine qua non</u>.

21. While concentrating at this stage on the issues of emergency relief and the provision of security for it, the United Nations will continue its efforts to implement the overall humanitarian programme for Somalia as reflected in

the updated consolidated inter-agency appeal, which I launched on 15 July 1992. The interrelated issues in the continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development have been identified in the report of the technical team and will be the subject of further reports.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF PREVENTIVE ZONES

22. Civil war, the insecurity and starvation are causing massive displacements and refugee flows. An emergency relief programme must try to halt these. A particularly serious situation exists along the Kenyan border, where some 280,000 Somali refugees are located, with 2,000 more arriving daily. The "preventive zone" concept reflected in the updated consolidated inter-agency appeal of 15 July 1992 needs to be put into effect immediately and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is ready to take the lead on this. The first phase of this programme will be the establishment of an operation to deliver food and seeds from Kenya to a preventive zone on the Somali side of the border in the Gedo region. This programme is intended to reduce significantly cross-border movements of people in search of food. It will also contribute to a decrease in frictions that are growing in the border area.

III. SECURITY AND CEASE-FIRE MONITORING

23. As noted in paragraph 20 above, the problem in Somalia today is not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to ports and airports in the country (though on occasions this can be hazardous) but the protection of the convoys that transport supplies from port or airport to warehouses and distribution centres, together with the protection of those stores and centres themselves. The technical team confirmed my earlier recommendation that this protection should be provided by United Nations security personnel operating on the lines described in paragraphs 27 to 29 of my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829).

24. As far as Mogadishu is concerned, that recommendation was agreed in principle by the Security Council in paragraph 4 of its resolution 751 (1992). Following consultations with the two parties in Mogadishu, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the agreements signed on 27 and 28 March 1992 (S/23829, annex I), my Special Representative obtained the agreement of both of them on 12 August 1992 to the earliest possible deployment in Mogadishu of a 500-strong security force (S/24451). The Government of Pakistan has agreed to contribute a unit for this purpose and the Government of the United States has agreed to airlift it to Mogadishu. It is hoped that this deployment can take place very early in September. I am convinced that it is required in order to improve the effectiveness of current humanitarian efforts in Mogadishu and its immediate neighbourhood.

25. The technical team obtained the agreement of those concerned for the deployment of similar security units in two other parts of Somalia. The first would be at Bossasso in the north-east and, like its counterpart at Mogadishu,

would provide security at the port, escort convoys of relief supplies to distribution centres and protect the centres during distribution. The second would be deployed inland in the south-west and, subject to the consent of the Government of Kenya, would be based at Mandera, which lies just on the Kenyan side of the border some 470 kilometres north-west of Mogadishu. This unit's task would be to escort convoys of relief supplies from Kenya to the preventive zone which is being established along the Somali side of the border, in the Gedo region, as described in paragraph 22 above.

26. There are two other places where I believe that it is necessary for United Nations security units to be deployed for protective purposes. These are Berbera in the north-west and Kismayu in the south-east. The agreement of those concerned has not yet been obtained but I have instructed my Special Representative to give the highest priority to bringing his consultations on this matter to a successful conclusion.

27. The technical team also evaluated the possible extension of the current cease-fire activities of UNOSOM at Mogadishu to other parts of the country. Following the consultations reported in paragraph 19 of my report of 22 July 1992 (S/24343), the 50 military observers authorized for Mogadishu completed their deployment on 23 July 1992. They have since been able to play a valuable role in helping the two sides to maintain the cease-fire. After a number of preliminary meetings between the Chief Military Observer and his military counterparts on both sides, UNOSOM was able to arrange the first meeting, on 2 August 1992, of a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee, chaired by the Chief Military Observer. The military observers are conducting mobile patrols in areas of Mogadishu, including the seaport and airport. Discussions continue to obtain for them freedom of movement to conduct mobile patrols in all parts of the city. The security situation in Mogadishu nevertheless remains precarious. On 4 August, heavy fighting took place in the Medina/Wagajir area of the city. UNOSOM succeeded in getting the parties to agree to a cease-fire and has since exerted strenuous efforts to prevent a resumption of hostilities.

28. As regards cease-fire monitoring in other parts of the country, the technical team paid particular attention to the possible deployment of military observers along the southern part of the Kenya-Somalia border. However, concern was expressed by several regional leaders about the implications of such an operation for the balance of military forces within the country. Given this attitude, the lack of an effective cease-fire and the fluidity of the fighting, I do not believe that it is at present feasible to deploy military observers for cease-fire monitoring purposes outside Mogadishu. The security of unarmed military observers would, in any case, be severely at risk in current circumstances.

29. I have accordingly instructed my Special Representative to inform me as soon as, in his judgement, conditions exist for the effective deployment of military observers, in reasonable security, to monitor cease-fires which can be negotiated in various regions, in addition to Mogadishu.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF FOUR ZONE HEADQUARTERS

30. It will be recalled that in my report of 22 July 1992 (S/24343, paras. 56 ff) I recommended that UNOSOM establish four operational zones, which would enable the Organization to establish a presence in all parts of Somalia and adopt an innovative and comprehensive approach dealing with the humanitarian relief and recovery programmes, the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process and national reconciliation, in a consolidated framework.

31. The technical team has confirmed the validity of this concept. I therefore propose to establish the four zone headquarters as quickly as possible. Each headquarters will be headed by a civilian official who will assist my Special Representative in all aspects of his duties. It is envisaged that at this stage the nucleus of each headquarters, consisting of the Zone Director and the necessary administrative staff, will be put in place, with additional elements being added as the volume of United Nations activities increases in connection with the humanitarian programmes, the cease-fire, security and national reconciliation.

V. OBSERVATIONS

32. Somalia poses a particularly difficult challenge to the United Nations, which must find a means of responding to the urgent and overwhelming needs of a population growing increasingly desperate in the face of widespread hunger, the absence of national administration, almost complete destruction of basic infrastructure, and acute insecurity. This report has described urgent steps, which are planned or already being taken, to mitigate the current widespread starvation in the areas most seriously affected by internal strife and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. The delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is fraught with difficulties because of the vicious cycle of insecurity and hunger. Lack of security prevents the delivery of food, while food shortages contribute significantly to the level of violence and insecurity.

33. The immediate need is to break this vicious cycle. There must then be a comprehensive programme of action covering humanitarian relief, the cessation of hostilities, the reduction of organized and unorganized violence, and national reconciliation. Action to achieve the necessary improvement of the security situation must be comprehensive and multifaceted. There will need to be measures to demobilize regular and irregular forces and to re-establish law and order, initially on a local basis. A wide range of supporting interventions will be required to help re-establish local police forces: training, uniforms, communications and other equipment, as well as advisory services. However, such United Nations assistance will have to be contingent upon conditions that will ensure the neutrality of such forces: agreement by all relevant local authorities on the need for a unified local police force and on a neutral command structure, recruitment based on objective criteria and external monitoring.

34. I continue to believe that "food for arms" could be an important component of an effort to improve security conditions through a disarmament and demobilization programme. The technical team has, however, advised that at this stage the general effectiveness of such a programme in isolation is doubtful. Under present circumstances, Somalis see arms as a means not only of personal security but also of survival.

35. The programme of action will also have to include educational and vocational training programmes that offer alternative employment opportunities. The basic thrust must be to provide people with real alternatives for survival other than possession of arms. Equal consideration must be given to the reintegration of militia forces into a normal society.

36. A fundamental consideration that should guide all United Nations activities in Somalia is that the Somalis themselves should progressively assume responsibility for establishing conditions and arrangements for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Thus, a stronger United Nations role in securing access, transport and distribution of relief supplies must be paralleled by an effort to involve Somali entities fully in all aspects of this process. It is important that Somalis should be able to see the advantage to them of working with the international community rather than obliging the international community to take initiatives of its own without them. The fact is that the international community cannot stand idly by and witness the unnecessary loss of human lives in Somalia.

37. Much of the action described and recommended in this report is covered by existing mandates. However, it will be necessary for the Security Council to authorize the increases in UNOSOM strength that I have recommended. I will circulate as soon as possible an addendum to the present report containing preliminary cost estimates for these. They relate to the establishment of the four zone headquarters of UNOSOM and to the deployment of four additional security units, each with a strength of up to 750 all ranks. The first two will serve in Bossasso and the south-west, where those concerned have already given their agreement. The others will be deployed in Berbera and Kismayu as soon as consultations with those concerned have reached a successful conclusion. The total strength of United Nations security personnel whom I currently envisage deploying to Somalia is thus up to 3,500 all ranks, including the unit of 500 which has already been authorized for Mogadishu and will be assuming its duties there very shortly.

Annex

United Nations technical team to Somalia: itinerary and programme of meetings

Mogadishu: 6 August 1992

The team met with the following members of the Interim Administration:

1. Ali Mahdi, Interim President
2. Dr. Aweys, Minister in the Presidency
3. General Mohammed Abdi, Commander, Government Forces

and with the following officials of the United Somali Congress (USC):

1. General Mohamad Farah Aidid, Commander, USC forces
2. Abdel-Karim Ali Ahmad, Secretary General, USC
3. Professor Issa

Bardera: 7 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. General Mohamad Farah Aidid, Commander, USC forces
2. Colonel Omar Jess, Chairman, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
3. Mohamad Abdi Warsame, Chairman, Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
4. Mohamad Nur Aliyu, Chairman, Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

Baidoa: 7 August 1992

The team met with the Governor and other local officials.

Belet Wien: 8 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Hassan Abdalle Qalad, Regional Governor
2. Ahmed Hagi Habibulah, Assistant Regional Governor
3. Mohamad Dado, District Commissioner

4. Mohamad Ahmed Hubero, Regional Security Commander

5. Omar Arte-Abdi, Police Commissioner

Kismayu: 9 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Ahmed Hoshe, Commander, SPM

2. Kismayu officials of the USC, SSNM, and SDM

3. Mr. Ahmed Jimale Geech, Commander, Somali Liberation Army (SLA), Kismayu

Galkaio/Garowe: 10 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, Chairman of State Emergency Committee

2. Colonel Said Mohamed Salah, Local Commander of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) Forces

3. Local Elders

Bossasso: 11 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. General Mohamad Abshir Musa, Chairman, SSDF

2. Mr. Bogor Abdulahi Bogor Muse, Head of Regional Administration

3. General Abdulahi Yousef, Commander, SSDF forces

4. General Osman S. Samanutar

Hargeisa/Burao: 12 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Abdurahman Ahmad Ali "Toor", President, Somali National Movement (SNM)

2. Ahmad Mohamad, Foreign Minister, SNM

3. Ahmad Mohamad Silanyo, Former President, SNM
Currently leader of Habr Toljaalo, Burao

Berbera: 13 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Ibrahim Hussein, Commander of Berbera Forces and Leader of Movement
2. Musa Hirsi, Chief of Elders
3. Abdilahi Abdi Muse, Head of Rehabilitation
4. Osman Hassan, Elders and Administration Committee

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24480/Add.1
28 August 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

1. In paragraph 37 of my report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia (S/24480), I indicated my intention to circulate as soon as possible an addendum to the report which would contain a preliminary cost estimate for the establishment of four operational zones and for an increase in the strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) security personnel of up to 3,500 all ranks, including the unit of 500 which has already been authorized for Mogadishu. An operation of this size and complexity would require an elaborate logistic, communications and medical support. In the precarious situation of Somalia, such support would be best provided by three specialized units, estimated at up to 719 all ranks at the early stage of deployment.

2. As stated in paragraph 31 of the report, I propose to establish four operational zone headquarters, as quickly as possible. Each zone headquarters will be headed by a civilian Zone Director, who with the necessary administrative staff will assist my Special Representative in all aspects of his duties. Additional civilian staff would be added as the volume of the United Nations activities increases in connection with the humanitarian programmes, the cease-fire, security and national reconciliation.

3. Should the Security Council agree to the proposed increase in the strength of UNOSOM, it is estimated that the overall cost, for a six-month period from 1 September 1992 to 28 February 1993, would amount to some $129.2 million. Thereafter, it is estimated that the monthly cost relating to these activities would be approximately $12.1 million. A breakdown of the estimated cost by category of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

4. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to enlarge the strength of UNOSOM, that the additional

cost relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the UNOSOM Special Account.

Annex

Cost estimate for the enlargement of the United Nations Operation in Somalia

(In thousands of United States dollars)

		Initial six months	Monthly thereafter
1.	Security component		
	(a) Military observers	880	170
	(b) Security personnel, pay and allowances	30 262	6 378
	(c) Logistical support personnel	6 923	894
2.	Civilian personnel, including travel to mission area 1/	14 135	2 830
3.	Accommodation including premises, construction and maintenance 2/	52 680	110
4.	Vehicle operations	4 780	245
5.	Aircraft operations	5 400	1 030
6.	Communications	7 502	105
7.	Miscellaneous equipment	3 040	30
8.	Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	3 587	331
	Total	129 189	12 123

1/ Provides for 212 international staff and 195 locally recruited staff.

2/ This estimate is based on the assumption that no facilities are available in the Mission area.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24481
25 August 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 AUGUST 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a facsimile letter dated 19 August 1992 from Mr. Vladimir Šeks, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia and President of the Government's Commission for the United Nations Protection Force.

We kindly request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 19 August 1992 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

Acting according to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992, by which the Security Council calls upon States to collate substantiated information in their possession relating to the violations of humanitarian law, and to make this information available to the Council;

Referring to Security Council resolution 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, by which it demands from all States to facilitate undisturbed delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Acting on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Croatia;

I wish to inform you personally, Your Excellency, and the United Nations Security Council about the violations of international humanitarian law as well as about some crucial moments in the implementation of the United Nations peace plan and of activities of the international community whose fulfilment the Republic of Croatia expects. In our view, the conditions have ripened for some urgent actions of the international community which, without requiring new means and special efforts, can contribute exceptionally to the establishment of peace in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The special reason for this letter is the fact that specific forms of war against the Republic of Croatia have occurred and, by not halting them, it makes the international community jointly responsible for suffering of the civilian population in the territory of the two Republics.

A wider area of the town of Slavonski Brod, territory of the Republic of Croatia outside the zone of the responsibility of the United Nations, under full control of the Croatian authorities has been endangered by special, rarely seen forms of activities by the Serbian aggressor, which are prohibited by international law.

Slavonski Brod is a municipality with approximately 120,000 people and at the present moment with more than 20,000 displaced persons and refugees from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This area is situated between the United Nations Protected Area Sectors East and West and separated from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the river Sava as a border. Slavonski Brod and the bridge across the river Sava are the only link with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in that part and also the place of largest pogrom of Muslim and Croatian populace from that Republic. It has been five months now that the town and its surroundings are daily under general alert and air-raid alerts. From the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the city constantly comes under artillery attacks using all kinds of weapons, overflights and bombardment by aircraft of former

Yugoslav National Army (JNA). From 23 March up to now the aggressor aircraft flew over the city area 130 times and were active 30 times. Many sorts of forbidden weapons were used; cluster bombs, HVAR 59 mm rockets and surface-to-surface missiles (FROG-7). From well fortified and hidden facilities of the former JNA the Serbs from the occupied territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are attacking the territory of the Republic of Croatia with unlimited quantity of weapons of the former JNA.

The Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbs from the United Nations Protected Area territories in the Republic of Croatia are using the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the attacks on another sovereign State.

The only aim of such an aggression is the destruction of civilian population and destruction of civilian facilities. Sufferings of children, innocent population and refugees are enormous. In the town's hospital, under the conditions of daily bombardment, some 3,500 people underwent the most complex medical treatments. Over 180 civilians, including 43 children, died from the consequences of the attacks. Only in the last 10 days 28 civilians were killed and 98 were wounded. On the day preceding this report more than 200 artillery and tank projectiles fell on the town and 7 civilians were killed.

Civilian population and civilian facilities are the aims of the destruction and demolition. The attacks of the aggressor are carried out indiscriminately through acts of violence and repression, deliberate infliction of injuries and sufferings. Such acts are contrary to the provisions of articles 51 and 52 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I). a/

Unprovoked, indiscriminate and savage attacks may result in an economic and ecological catastrophe which could happen if oil facilities on both sides of the river are destroyed. The consequence of that would be a new and terrible suffering of the civilian population and displaced persons. The aggressor condemned to sanctions and oil embargo is capable of doing that. In addition to these atrocities committed in respect of the population of the Republic of Croatia, we would like to point out the sufferings of the civilian population in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Apart from the wider area of Gorazde, the area of northern Bosnia and Herzegovina is the area with the biggest suffering of the civilian population including the Muslim displaced persons who had been surrounded by the enemy for many weeks. The situation concerning the fully destroyed places along the road from Bosanski Brod to Sarajevo is completely uncertain.

Therefore, in order to stop unknown sufferings of the civilian population and their homes, because of the violation of all recognized rules of international humanitarian law and the principle of humanity and in order to remove the danger of possible catastrophes we urge that on the basis of

Security Council resolutions 770 (1992) and 771 (1992), in cooperation with the United Nations forces and the forces of regional, European defence organizations, the securing of the corridor for humanitarian aid for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Slavonski Brod (Bosanski Brod)-Sarajevo route be carried out with military support.

The securing of the above-mentioned corridor, in addition to the possible Split-Sarajevo corridor from the south, would be the cessation of the Serbian aggression from the possible territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards that part of the Republic of Croatia and the securing of the section Slavonski Brod-Sarajevo (approximately the same length as the direction Split-Sarajevo) would result in the cessation of the aggression and would ensure that the badly needed humanitarian aid reaches the northern and central part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The suggested solution, I am convinced, would contribute to the cessation of the aggression on the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Republic of Croatia will provide full and comprehensive assistance for all activities of the international community in achieving the mentioned goals.

(Signed) Vladimir ŠEKS
Vice-President of the Government
of the Republic of Croatia
President of the Government's Commission
for UNPROFOR

Notes

a/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.